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Abstract 
This paper proposes an empirical analysis about the influence of some institu-
tional factors (taxation, active and passive labor market policies, labor and 
goods market regulation and unions’ participation) on the component of the 
wage growth not explained by the productivity growth (WP gap, thereafter). 
We consider a 14 OECD countries Panel Data over the period 1983-2003, us-
ing four different estimations: fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD), 
fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE) and feasible general least square 
(FGLS). Results for all estimations show that the WP gap is affected by tax 
wedge, active labor market policies, employment protection for temporary 
workers and union density, while product market regulation and passive labor 
market policies do not play a significant role. 
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1. Introduction 
Starting from the Eighties, Italy and most of the European countries have been 
involved in significant reforms in labor and goods market, aiming to modify the 
mechanism of price formation, the degree of labor and product market rigidity, 
the incidence of taxation and the bargaining process between unions and firms. 
In this paper we analyze from the empirical point of view the effects of these in-
stitutional changes on the share of wage growth not explained by the productiv-
ity growth (WP gap, thereafter). 
Some authors focus their attention on the role of some institutional factors 
affecting productivity. [1] analyzes the differences between productivity growth 
in the US and in the European Union. Looking at their results, the US shows a 
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higher level of productivity growth with respect to the EU, because they achieved 
ICT investment with more intensity than European countries. In particular, the 
United States performs high level of ICT investment because of the decrease of 
the mark-up, caused by the deregulation in the product market. [2] shows that 
reforms towards a more competitive product market produce more positive ef-
fect on GDP and productivity growth than in a rigid labor market. [3] proposes 
an empirical investigation about the effects of labor market deregulation on 
productivity growth. They highlight that a deregulation not accompanied by the 
support for dismissal workers, could affect negatively productivity and GDP 
growth. 
[4] considers a OECD panel over the period 1985-2007 finding that wages 
grows more than productivity only for permanent workers, while temporary 
workers show the opposite behavior because their lower bargaining power. The 
increase of the share of temporary workers in most of the European countries 
can thus explain the increase of the wage productivity gap. 
[5] evaluates the effects on productivity of a deregulation policy on good and 
labor market. The authors find that, through their impact on production prices 
and wages, a liberalization in the product and labor market can produce positive 
effects on multifactor productivity over the years. 
[6] studies the relationship between wage and productivity taking into ac-
count the wage setting process in different countries. His results show that in co- 
untries with high collective bargaining coverage wage follows productivity, while 
in countries like U.S. a decentralize system of wage bargaining is able to explain 
a causality in the opposite direction1. [8] sets up a model with monopolistic 
competition in the goods market, entry costs and Nash bargaining structure. 
They show that a more flexible labor market and a more competitive product 
market bring about, in the medium run, productivity growth with positive ef-
fects on wages and on the employment rate. 
The paper is structured as follow: The next section describes the data, while 
section 3 explains methodology. Section 4 displays and discusses the results. Sec-
tion 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
We take our sample from the [9] dataset. The Panel comprises 14 countries over 
the period 1983-2003. 
The dependent variable, the WP gap, is the residual series of the OLS regres-
sion between the growth rate of real wages per employee and the labor produc-
tivity growth. 
The independent variables are: 1) the average unemployment benefit replace-
ment rate (arr); 2) the initial unemployment benefit replacement rate (rr1); 3) 
the tax wedge (labortax); 4) the unions density (undens); 5) the union coverage 
in the collective bargaining (uncovcm); 6) the product market regulation index 
(pmr); 7) the employment protection legislation index for temporary workers 
 
 
1See also [7]. 
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(eplt) and for permanent workers (eplr); 8) four components of active labor 
market policies: Training (almptrain), measures for youth unemployment (alm-
pyouth), employment subsidies (almpempl) and spending for public employ-
ment services (almppes)2. 
3. Methodology 
We use four methods: Fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), fixed effects 
(FE), random effects (RE) and feasible general least square (FGLS). The first one 
is a new estimator and it is described in detail, the other three estimators are tra-
ditional and widely used in the literature. 
The FEVD, developed for the first time by [10] and [11], is able to take into 
account time invariant variables and rarely changing variables, like the institu-
tions and at the same time to consider the fixed effects3. 
This method consists in three passages. We start from the following basic Eq-
uation:  
1 1
K M
it k kit m mi i itk mY x z uα β γ ε= == + + + +∑ ∑              (1) 
where the x variables are time variant, the z variables are time invariant, 𝑢𝑢 
represents the fixed effects—the unit specific effects—and ε the error term. 
The first step of the FEVD procedure—the estimate of a standard fixed effects 
model—is making through a fixed effects transformation over T . Now, we 
write a first averaging Equation: 
1 1
M
k ki m mi i iki m
K eY x z uβ γ
= =
= + + +∑ ∑                 (2) 
where iY , ix  and ie  are respectively: 
1 1 1;  
1 1;  1  T T Tit i it ii itt t tY x x e eY T T T= = =
= = =∑ ∑ ∑  and e  are the residuals. The ob- 
jective of the transformation is to eliminate of the time invariant variables and 
the fixed effects. To reach these objectives we subtract Equation (2) from equa-
tion (1). Simplifying and calling ,  ,  it it kit kii i i iY Y x e e eY x= − = = −    we obtain: 
1
K
it k kik it eY xβ = += ∑                          (3) 
while the pooled OLS fixed effects estimate is:  
1
ˆ FKit ik
E
i ku xY eβ== − −∑                       (4) 
The estimate includes the unobserved fixed effects. 
In the second stage, we regress the estimate unit specific effects, obtained in 
the first step, on the time invariant variables in order to divide what is explained 
by the slow changing variables and what is unexplained. 
The estimated fixed effects with the time invariant is described by the follow-
ing Equation:  
1
ˆ M m mi imiu z hγ== +∑                        (5) 
where ih  is the term that represent the unexplained part while the explained 
 
 
2For details see appendix. 
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part is described by the time invariant variables miz . The aim of this passage is 
to estimate ih  
1
ˆ Mi m mimih zu γ== −∑                       (6) 
In the third step the full model is estimated, using pooled OLS method, as in 
the first passage, but without the unit effects and with ih : 
1 1
K M
it kit m mi i ik k tmY x z hα γ δ εβ= =++ + += ∑∑             (7) 
From Equation (7), by construction, ih  is no longer correlated with the vec-
tor of the time invariant variables. 
The fixed effects (FE) analysis, with respect to FEVD, does not take into ac-
count the time invariant variables. Thus, Equation (1) becomes: 
1
K
it kit i itk kY x u εβα = += + +∑                   (8) 
where iu  represents the time independent fixed effects term. The iu  is a vec-
tor and it identifies an unobserved effect for each entity considered in our sam-
ple countries. This term could be correlated with the independent variables but 
it must not be correlated with the error term otherwise the estimator could be 
inconsistent. 
The random effects (RE) model is similar to FE model but the effects is chosen 
randomly and is not correlated with the independent variables. Besides, the term 
iu  is not more time invariant in the sample. 
The fourth method used for the analysis is the feasible generalized least square 
(FGLS). The sample used for our estimation is large enough, so that the FGLS 
estimator is not biased as could be in small sample. 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the results of our estimation. All four estimation methods pro-
posed show the same significant variables. RE and FGLS display the best per-
formance in terms of significance. EPL for regular workers (eplr) is statistically 
significant at the 10% only with FE method. 
Looking at Table 1, we have: 1) the tax wedge (labortax) is significant with a 
positive coefficient. In this case, a reduction in the tax wedge produces a wage 
moderation from the supply side because part of the earnings lost can be recov-
ered by the lower tax; 2) the union density (undens) is significant with a negative 
sign: strong union power does not lead to a rise in the wage-productivity gap. In 
order to evaluate this result, you can think that in many European countries un-
ions do not only pursue the objective of increasing wages but they also pay at-
tention to the productivity and others macroeconomics variables (for example, 
employment stability); 3) training for unemployed workers (almptrain) is sig-
nificant with a negative coefficient. This kind of active labor market policy can 
thus reduce the component of the wage growth not explained by the productivi-
ty growth; 4) employment protection for temporary workers (eplt) affects nega-
tively the WP gap. This result seems to confirm the one obtained by [4]. 
Passive labor market policies (unemployment benefits) and the strictness of 
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regulation in the goods market do not seem to play a role in affecting the gap 
between wage and productivity growth. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed from an empirical point of view the effects of 
some institutional factors (taxation, active and passive labor market policies, la-
bor and goods market regulation and the unions’ role during the wage bargain-
ing) on the component of the wage growth not explained by the productivity 
growth. We have considered a Panel data related to 14 OECD countries over the 
period 1983-2003, using four different estimation methods. 
 
Table 1. Estimation results. 
dependent variable: wage gap 
 FEVD FE RE FGLS 
arr −0.0010 −0.0010 −0.0015 −0.0015 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0022) 
rr1 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 
 (0.0085) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0055) 
labortax 0.0152** 0.0107* 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0057) 
eplr 0.0093 0.0093 * 0.0068 0.0068 
 (0.0083) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0051) 
eplt −0.0038* −0.0038* −0.0034* −0.0034* 
 (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
pmr 0.0005 0.0005 0.0017 0.0017 
 (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0037) 
undens −0.0158* −0.0158** −0.0123** −0.0123** 
 (0.0085) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
almptrain −0.0022** −0.0022*** −0.0026 *** −0.0026*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
almyouth 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
almpemp1 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
almppes 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 0.0007 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
uncovcm 0.0009 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
constant 0.0121 0.0121 0.0122 0.0122 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
R-squared 0.1430 0.1154 0.1284 0.0034° 
invariant tabortax    
Value of t statistics in brackets. *, **, ***statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respective-
ly. °Value of Chi Square test. 
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What emerges from the result of our analysis is that an economic policy based 
on training for unemployment workers and on the reduction of the tax wedge 
can reduce the WP gap. Union density and employment protection for tempo-
rary workers can also play a role to reach this objective. 
In this sense, this paper suggests a clear hierarchy of priorities for the eco-
nomic policy to bring the wage growth in line with the productivity growth. 
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Appendix: Description of the Independent Variables 
Average unemployment benefit replacement rate (arr):Average unemployment 
benefit replacement rate across two income situations (100% and 67% of the av-
erage production worker earnings), three family situations (single, with depen-
dent spouse, with spouse in work) and three different unemployment durations 
(first year; second and third years; fourth and fifth years of unemployment). 
Initial (first year) unemployment benefit replacement rate (rr1): Average 
unemployment benefit replacement rate during the first year of unemployment 
across two income situations (100% and 67% of the average production worker 
earnings) and three different family situations (single, with dependent spouse, 
with spouse in work). 
Labor tax wedge (labortax): Tax wedge calculated following the National Ac-
counts principles. It includes all the direct taxes, but excludes the social benefits. 
Union density (undens): Share of workers affiliated to a trade union, in per-
centage of total employment. 
Union coverage (uncovcm): Collective bargaining coverage rate, the share of 
workers covered by a collective agreement calculated as a percentage of total 
employment. 
Public expenditures on active labor market policies: The public expenditures 
on active labor market policies per unemployed worker as a share of GDP per 
capita, in percentage. We have five main categories defined as follow: 1) labor 
market training (almptrain): Training for unemployed adults and those at risk, 
training for employed adults (youth and disabled people are excluded); 2) meas-
ures for youngpeople (almpyouth): special plans concerning measures for un-
employed and disadvantaged youth, support of apprenticeship and related forms 
of general youth training; 3) subsidized employment (almpemp1): Targeted 
measures to promote or provide employment for the unemployed and other 
priority groups (youth and disabled people are excluded); 4) public employment 
services and administration (almppes): Placement, counseling and vocational 
guidance, job-search courses, assistance with displacement costs, administration 
of unemployment benefits, all other administration costs of labor market agen-
cies including running labor market plans; 5) measures for disabled people (not 
considered in our estimation): Special plans about rehabilitation and project 
with the purpose to improve the employment of disabled people. 
Employment protection legislation index (EPL): The OECD index measuring 
the strictness of employment protection legislation. The index varies from 0 to 6 
and is built taking into account: a) the employment protection for regular work-
ers against individual dismissals, in particular a1) difficulty in individual layoffs; 
a2) bureaucratic barriers that firms have to deal with in case of a worker’s layoff; 
a3) measures to adopt in case of an advance notice. b) Specific requirements for 
collective dismissals. c) Regulation of temporary forms of employment. In our 
analysis, we consider two separate variables of EPL, that related to workers with 
permanent contracts (eplr) and that related to workers with temporary contracts 
(eplt). 
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Product market regulation (pmr): The OECD index measuring the degree of 
rigidity in the product market. The PMR assumes a value from 0 to 6 and is 
computed with regard to seven sectors: gas, electricity, telecommunication, mail, 
air transport, railway transport, and freight transport. It is based on 18 indica-
tors, which take into account: entry barriers, if the networks are privates or pub-
lics, integral vertical processes, prices control prices, duties customs, bureaucrat-
ic barriers, the presence of the public administration in the governance of firms 
in strategic sectors-like telecommunications-and the presence of the public ad-
ministration as stockholder in firms which operate in the business sector. 
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